Interrogating Interpassivity by jagodzinski, jan













    jan jagodzinski  
The concept of interpassivity as developed by Robert Pfaller and Slavoj Žižek has 
become ubiquitous throughout many disciplines: media, sociology, technology 
studies, gamming, public spaces and so on. Interpassivity is pitted against the more 
common understanding of intersubjectivity to worry the question of agency and 
belief in the symbolic order as it is remains covered over by the glass bell of 
capitalism. In this essay, I argue that this concept is much too simplistic and 
restricted in its machinic repetition, borrowing too heavily from the Lacanian 
understanding of desire as lack, and much too pessimistic for any future thought of 
challenging capitalism. This essay takes the format of a series of numbered points. 
Such a structure helps facilitate the multiple issues that present themselves with this 
concept. Generally, speaking, this essay is more a query into the difficulties with the 
concept of interpassivity, and some of the possible other directions that this concept 
can take us, especially away from its deeply Lacanian roots, and into a more Deleuze 




According to the genealogy outlined by Robert Pfaller on his website1,  
twenty-years have passed since the kernel-concept of interpassivity was born. The 
idea was developed in Linz, Austria in 1996, from there it travelled to Nürnberg in 
1997, and then on to Berlin in 1998. The book’s title by the same name (Interpassvität) 
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fortuitously emerged at the turn of the 21st century (2000). Verso published Pfaller’s 
book ‘on the pleasure principle in culture’ in 2014, and more recently, Edinburgh 
Press published a collection of seminal essays in 2017, which charts some of the 
main applications to art, religion, and ritual. These last two books have made the 
concept more accessible to the Anglo-speaking academics. Generally speaking 
then, for Pfaller the concept’s historical conceptualization emerged in the second 
part of the 1990s. 
 
 As is also well known, Interpassvität was equally articulated and developed by 
Slavoj Žižek’s (1997; 1998a,b) Lacanian inflected readings in the 90s, which 
complemented and elaborated Pfaller’s own, by-and-large, Freudian centered 
approach, although Pfaller has made some nuanced distinctions between his 
approach and that of Žižek.2 Pfaller’s own initiative emerged from the position of 
aesthetics where he argued that interpassivity challenged the claims of interactive 
artworks. For Pfaller’s (2008: 30-33) aesthetically inflected use in 1996, the artwork 
takes away performative necessity or effort by its onlookers; viewers are released 
from their obligation to intervene in its completion. Interactivity becomes superfluous 
as such artwork does not require visitors’ active involvement; there may well be 
interactive engagement when it comes to this interpassive condition on the part of 
art, but it may be of no consequence in completing the artwork’s function. Such 
artwork is said to relieve the spectator from the burden of interactivity. 
 
 The kernel of the idea, at first glance, seems readily accessible and seemingly 
understandable: “Interpassivity comprises delegated enjoyment” (2017, 18). Pfaller at 
first develops this in the aesthetic realm, at the turn of the 21st century. The general 
claim is that such artwork is self-sufficient, not requiring any form of input or 
engagement with its audience. It does its own ‘doing,’ or ‘thing‘, so to speak. This 
stance is rather puzzling given that ‘all’ works of art should be autonomous. For 
Deleuze and Guattari (1994), for instance, an artwork is ‘monumental’ in the sense 
that it harbours ‘blocs of sensation’ (percepts and affects). But these have to be 
‘released’ or activated through an encounter.  If there is no encounter, then nothing 
much happens. Pfaller seems to suggest that the artwork has its own encounter 
despite an audience. The encounter, it seems, is of a different order … puzzling. 
 
 Pfaller (2002: 27-32; 2004: 54) mentions Jenny Holzer’s moveable text 
exhibitions, which can be said to ‘read themselves.’ Many gallery visitors soon tire of 







bothering to actually read every single pithy saying, truism, witticism or anecdote. It’s 
the symbolic order thrown in your face as an everyday banality, a confirmation of 
such textual circulation that simply leads to cynicism (Yes, that’s how the world-for-us 
‘is.’ Live with it; play with it; spit at it; do as you please with it!). If the gallery goer 
experiences ‘enjoyment,’ it can only be one distancing the visitor from what these 
‘sayings’ are capable of ‘truly’ doing: pointing to a harsh reality where ‘words do inflict 
psychic harm’ as the spread of bullying in schools and workplaces has become so 
obvious and widespread. Trump’s presidential tweets are perhaps exemplary here, 





Questioning the difficulty of difference between interactivity and interpassivity as 
developed by Pfaller might be illustrated by comparing performativity between two 
installations. The first is a performance by Marina Abramović, The Artist is Present 
staged in 2010 at MoMA where she sat for 750 hours as one participant at a time was 
invited to sit across a table from her in silence. Eye contact and facial gestures were 
all that were allowed. No touching or talking. One would be hard pressed to precisely 
define interactivity or interpassivity in this endurance work. Neither one seems to 
easily apply here. There is no relief from interactive burden just gazing into a 
stranger’s eyes. And, just what sort of ‘interactivity’ is the participant doing to 
‘complete’ the piece? Both the participant and Abramović must cope with the 
memories that begin to flood the conscious as they look at one another as a 
transference of some sort does take place. Whose gaze is being captured by the look 
in this exchange? Abramović cries, participant’s cry, spectators cry. Abramović 
maintains that the emotional outbursts of tears are an indication of loneliness and 
the distancing that telematic media have ‘wrought,’ a dubious claim. It is the same 
argument Nicholas Bourriaud formulated with his ‘relational aesthetics’ in 1998 that 
covered the art of the ‘90s; the same ‘art’ that Pfaller was addressing with his new 
term. For Bourriaud, the artist was a catalyst for staging mico-events of conviviality, 
like Rirkrit Tiravanija cooking in the gallery for his visitors. The ‘relationality’ between 
artist and participant in these artworks again suspend any easy distinction between 
interactive and interpassive involvement.  
 What critics of relational art pointed out, despite Bourriaud’s hype of radicality, 
was that it was the spectacle of the gallery that made this form of ‘relationality’ 







possible, exchanges between a gallery elite and elite artists. This, too, is the case 
with Abramović (Jones, 2011). The spectacle of her performance achieved its height 
when her former lover and co-endurance artist, Ulay (Frank Uwe Laysiepen), sat 
down across the table from her. Ulay’s involvement with Marina in the early years of 
performativity had all but been erased. The video segment went viral, appropriately 
dressed up in sentimental background music. Abramović leaned over and reached 
out with her hands, which Ulay then grasped, saying some incomprehensible words. 
The audience clapped. Tears followed. The ‘presence’ of that tender moment was 
certainly felt by all spectators. What then to make of Ulay suing Abramović five-years 
latter for breach of contract, winning a quarter of a million Euro settlement?  
 
 The second example is by Paul Sermon entitled Telematic Dreaming, 
exhibited in 1992. This is an interactive artwork between two locations: Kajaani Art 
Gallery, England and the Helsinki Telegalleria, Finland. Telematic Dreaming is 
considered a paradigmatic example of interaction.3 The installation uses a bed in 
each location to stage a teleconferencing experience whereby participants interact 
with each other via a projection and television monitor.4 A virtual moving body 
appears projected on a bed from afar via a video camera. Another moving body that 
is actually on the same bed is then able to interact with this projected body as seen 
on three television screens that circle the bed. The reverse is also possible making 
each actual body interact with a virtually projected body as seen on a series of three 
screens placed around each bed. The tactile sense is exchanged by sight alone. The 
live figure and the projected figure can interact with each another ‘visually’ by looking 
at their dual projections on each other’s respective beds that appear on the screens. 
It’s possible, for instance, to superimpose one’s projection on top of the other, and 
intuitively move accordingly. Without the presence of a user, the installation does not 
‘work.’ Otherwise, it’s just an empty bed with someone laying on it. A participant 
coming to the installation can become absorbed ‘into’ the bed only when there is 
communication with the projected person. There does not seem to be any possibility 
to talk to the projected person, only gestures are allowed, at least not from the video 
of the installation that is made available online; nor was any potential for sexual 
abuse and exploitation mentioned, although the installation draws on the 
psychological intimacy of the bedroom environment as well as the disjoined sensory 
experience of ‘touching’ a person in their projected image. As Sermon (1992) puts it: 
“The telepresent image functions like a mirror that reflects one person within another 
person’s reflection (n.p.).”  








 This early work raises the relationship between the virtual and the visual; and 
that all perception is embodied; it is physical and visceral. The media theoretical 
work of Mark Hansen (2004) has developed this insight of late. In immersive art 
environments,5 those that were created around the time of Pfaller’s development of 
interpassivity, we have another picture emerging. Char Davies’s Osmose6  (1995) and 
Ephémère7 (1998) present a body experience of interaction where one is hard 
pressed to identity a symbolic where enjoyment is delegated as the immerse 
technological environment becomes a way to enhance the ephemerality of affect. As 
Davies puts it, “within this [immersive] spatiality, there is no split between the 
observer and the observed” (2003a:1). Davies, in effect, redefines and rewrites the 
usual subject-object correlationalism of technology that stems from a Heideggerian 
understanding. As she further writes: “the immersive environment could thus be said 
to harbour a unique convergence, or even an osmotic intermingling of spatialities—
interior and exterior, mental, physical and social-which can be artistically—
constructed, bodily inhabited and performed. …Virtual [immersive] space is a new 
kind of conceptual and experiential working space, one that not only paradoxically 
integrates the virtual and the real, but which potentially (when constructed in a 
certain way) facilitates a dissolution of conventional boundaries between perceiver 
and perceived (2003b, np., author’s italic). 
 
 Osmose utilizes a head-mounted display and motion tracking of the breath 
and balance, as in the scuba diver’s practice of buoyancy control where one 
breathes in to float upwards, and one breathes out to fall, leaning gently to change 
directions. Hansen (2006) provides a description of the experience of having no 
visible body in front of you, but hearing a soundscape of human voices that swirl 
around the ‘immersant’ as they navigate this innovative space. In the Deleuzian 
(1990) sense, it is sensation as affect and percept that is being directly experienced.  
Ephémère is even more dramatic in this attempt to directly feel the sensate of the 
environment, as it explores the symbolic correspondence between body and earth, 
and the ephemerality of all life. The visuals and sounds respond to participant 
behaviours that emerge and withdraw according to the location, proximity, speed, 
gaze and passage of time as structured by three realms: landscape, earth and body. 
The immersive experience begins in winter with the landscape flowing day and 
night, from spring to autumn depending on the location of the ‘immersant.’ No 
journey is ever the same.  










What is being raised in the emerging 3.0 interactive environment is the in-between 
space-time that is created within the gap of the virtual and the actual, which is the 
virtual ‘world’ that avatars make possible, a third space that is distinguished by its 
own imaginary, a transmediated ‘living between worlds’ space. Char Davies follows 
Henri Lefebvre here. She writes, “Lefebvre calls for the production of ‘counter space’ 
as an alternative against the homogenizing effects of absolute space of Western 
metaphysics and science: I consider my virtual environments as steps towards 
producing such a space” (2003b, np). 
 
 Artists exploring this third space present an array of complex approaches, 
which would question the simple interpassivity hypothesis. The early work of Char 
Davies presents an experience from inside the virtual world only, already worrying 
interpassivity. Litchy (2009) provides a further three approaches that, again make us 
pause to ask what is this symbolic Other that is delegated enjoyment, as the third 
space-time generated – where there is movement from virtual to the tangible 
(physical) – complexifies the issue. ‘Evergent artworks’ are artworks that ‘everge’ in 
their structural and physical origins in the virtual, which are then realized through 
haptic devices and sensor arrays (Novak, 2002). ‘Cybrid environments’ (Anders, 
1998), on the other hand, simultaneously co-exist in virtual and physical modes, such 
as Augmented Reality (AR), Physical Computing (PC) and Telepresence. These 
artworks raise further complications with simplistic psychoanalytic explanations. 
Evergent technologies and artworks, where only the screen, keyboard and mouse as 
the physical interfaces are used, do not significantly integrate the physical 
environment as part of the interface with the virtual. Novak’s ‘evergence’ is the 
obverse of immersion: “Eversion … signifies a turning inside-out of virtuality, as 
casting outward of the virtual into the space of everyday experience” (Novak, 2002: 
311). For Novak, eversion is a concept for more precise imagining.  Perhaps this is 
the classical understanding of 2.0 cyberspace, which engages proponents of 
interpassivity, especially Second Life that presents an obvious Platonic duality. It 
seems easy here to assign delegated enjoyment to the avatars as Mathias Fuchs 
(2008) does. He explores a wide range of interpassive activities including erotic 
interpassivity, academic interpassivity, political interpassivity, sexual interpassivity, 
and artistic interpassivity. 








 Yet, Second Life is much more open environment than many video games 
where the object is ‘mostly’ defined, and not as easily modified, suggesting that there 
is less ‘agency’ given over to the video game than Second Life where the capacity to 
manipulate the environment is much more open. What to make of interpassivity 
when considering Second Life artist, Scott Kildall ‘s Paradise Ahead 8 (2007)? This is a 
series of twelve print-performances where avatars, rendered in Second Life primitive 
graphics, stage well known performance artists (like Chris Burden’s Shoot 
performance from 1971). A ‘zone of ambiguity’ opens up that presents a simulated 
world that still references the familiarity of the body and the iconic artistic 
performance. Such remediated images are autonomous; an image refers to other 
images and interpretations to the reality it is meant to represent. The image as 
simulacra (disparaged by Plato as distorted representation, a copy of a copy) implies 
a distorted or lost reality in the theorizing of Jean Baudrillard (1988), but, directly in 
opposition, Gilles Deleuze (1990) takes simulacra to be a positive dimension, a 
vehicle of becoming that creates new extensions of reality, as in Scott Kidall’s work; 
or, as in Eva and Franco Mattles, other Second Life artists whose Thirteen Most 
Beautiful Avatars reference Warhol’s series of film portraits from 1964-1965; or their 
remediation artwork that references Joseph Beuys’ 7000 Oaks.  
 
Such works that recontextualize actual conceptual works into the virtual are 
not without issues. They are examples that push against the symbolic. In this regard, 
the artist Lynn Hershman-Leeson has created mediated identities (Roberta 
Breitmore, a work of the 1970s, performed for 4 years in San Francisco where her ‘life’ 
was documented through photography and installations, and Roberta Ware, “Life to 
the Second Power,” a cybrid existing in both virtual and actual worlds). Such 
mediated artistic identities provide ways to introduce different psychic structures, 
especially schizo-characters as forwarded by Deleuze and Guattari’s (1987) idea of 
schizoanalysis. These become explorations of other simulated worlds of possible 
living, in Hershman-Leeson’s case, actually experimenting with actualized 
characters. 
 
 Impassivity is not easily to maintain with Cybid environments either. A good 
example is the installation by Perry Hoberman’s Systems Maintenance9 where a 
furnished room’s layout is reiterated in three ways: a full-scale of the furniture layout 
is presented on a circular platform on a floor, a virtual room of it is displayed on a 







computer monitor, and a one-eight size physical scale is presented on a small 
pedestal. Each version is imaged by a camera (either via video or virtually). The three 
images are then combined into a single video projection. The camera position’s 
height, angle, and field of view are matched between the three cameras. The 
interactor(s) to the installation move furniture on the scaled model or on the full-scale 
model to match or mismatch the resultant images on the large screen. Issues of 
order-disorder are always in play; the interactor’s position of being inside or outside 
the installation becomes confused; the impossibility of distinguishing between the 
three projected images until objects are moved is also at play. The interplay between 
an ‘adjustment team,’ who try to put the furniture ‘back’ in place, and interactants 
who are constantly shuffling pieces around, cause an ongoing flow of impossible 
adjustments. These are just some of the complexities of this installation piece as a 
fourth space is effectively created on the large screen that is constantly flowing and 
moving as it becomes impossible to have all the furniture from the three projections 
line up. The pre-subjective realm that is being explored in wholly immersive art 
technologies, like that of Davies, and artistic variations that are possible with 
evergent creations and Cybid installations, present challenges to an interpassive 
position as artists are operating in multiple worlds. The traversal between the actual 
(tangible) and the virtual provide many possibilities and complexities. They open a 
third dimensional space that surpasses interpassivity and interactivity. I would argue 
that that is the potential space of creativity that escapes such dichotomies. 
 
 This is a ‘virtual Real,’ but it has a marked physicality and is no longer the Real 
of a Lacanian- Žižekian-Pfaller void, which is said to distance us from the reality as 
such. The manufactured psychoanalytic argument by Žižek claims that, in our failed 
attempts to immediately touch reality, there is a tumble into the void that is the ‘limit’ 
of the symbolic order where the Lacanian Real is encountered. For Žižek’s Lacan, this 
is a raw materiality that is true and brutal horror. This argument is extended by 
maintaining that such horror (the kernel of the Real) is distanced or avoided, 
especially via interpassivity: sweeteners without sugar enable us to ‘enjoy’ sugar; like 
coffee without caffeine, or alcohol free beer and wine, and avatars that do it for us, 
and so on. The threat of the Real is avoided by acting out through the virtual. The 
virtual allows an indulgence in a boundless consumption, rather non-consumption 
without any effects. Computer gaming allows all sorts of violence to be performed 
but there is no regret or guilt, no one is ‘hurt.’  In the brief summary of the simulacrum 
(as developed above, #3), virtual images go much further than a simple escapist 







fantasy of interpassivity. The third space generates new worlds, the positivity that 
Deleuze (1994) advocates with the ‘powers of the false.’ 
 
 Writing around the same time as Pfaller, the distancing effects of the virtual 
lead to what Stjepan Meštrović (1997) referred to as ‘postemotionalism.’ 
Postemotionalism is perhaps a more adequate term to identify the outsourcing of 
emotions that provides Žižek with his pet examples of interpassivity: canned 
television laughter, the Greek chorus taken from Lacan’s Ethics seminar, professional 
wailers (mourners), the Tibetan prayer wheel, and the general deferral of religions, for 
instance, to Protestant reformation where the doctrine of predestination provided the 
excuse and permission to indulge in the worst excesses of capitalism. It is rather odd 
to say that in these cases one ‘gives away one’s passivity’ so that one may ‘enjoy’ as 
one likes; it seems rather confusing if not outright a misrepresentation, as it is not 
‘passivity’ which is being given away, but one’s possible ‘interactivity,’ or one’s varied 
emotions in this particular case. I need not weep, laugh, nor pray as the transfer of 
emotions to these objects, machines, and institutions, which take care of this so that I 
can distract myself in other ways, or go about my business as usual. As is typical of 
Žižek, I can have pornographic thoughts while the Tibetan prayer wheel does its ‘job,’ 
or I can coldly settle the estate of the diseased as I am now in control of my emotions 
given that mourners are at work; or, I can now play at being a hedonistic capitalist as 
I know my fate is already determined in advance.  It’s simply a deferral or a disavowal 
that enables us to go on living, or coping with the way things are, or providing an 
excuse for my action as the big Other is looking after things for me. Action (or 
interaction) is staved off, as perhaps nothing can be done about the way the 
symbolic world is presented to us. Passive action can be justified in just this way. The 
laugh track of the sitcom simply confirms for me the stupidity of people as they go 
about living, such comedy is more to do with an ironic stance to the world-for-us 
than a deep belly laugh that truly exposes me to the stupidity of the big Other 
wherein I find myself facing my own human limitations, a comic acknowledgment of 
a palpable sense of impotence, impossibility, as well as inability (Crichley, 2009). 
Laugh tracks don’t appear with stand-up comedians where the absurdity of life is 
exposed on stage; the sardonic comedy of a stand-up comedian is an exposure of a 
‘self’ that must bear the brunt of the Symbolic Other, the brute force of Law that 
always place me as a failure as I can never live up to full expectations, confirming 
that we are fallible creatures.  
 









The body of work by Gjis van Oenen (2004, 2006, 2008a,b, 2011) provides perhaps a 
third major theorist to apply and articulate the concept of impassivity via an historical 
account that dwells on the vicissitudes of democratic participation and emancipation 
that took a turn from their interactive progressive developments in the 1960s and 
1970s when institutional civil rites reform took place. Van Oenen maintains that this 
progressive emancipatory activism quite suddenly turned into assertive liberal 
individualism in the 1980s and 1990s. Interpassivity became the ‘post-emancipatory’ 
condition as fingered by Pfaller in the second half of the 1990s. The concept attempts 
to capture the withdrawal of an interactive self to one of ‘delegating’ or ‘outsourcing’ 
such interactivity to the institutional sphere, or to artworks themselves. This amounts 
to the peculiar claim that the object, artwork, or institution is in a sense ‘performing’ 
interactivity for the audience, viewers, or participants, who remain ‘passive,’ and 
‘enjoy’ this turn of affairs, as if content that there is no need to be actively engaged; as 
if such engagement would be a burden, stressful or overwhelming. Interpassivity 
replaces interactivity in this view.  
 
This is easy to understand, as George Barrlett (2016) demonstrates through his 
historical examination of Levi jeans. He ends his analysis with the strong and 
convincing claim that manufactured ripped jeans one buys today are a perfect 
example of interpassivity as its wearer no longer performs the rebellion and 
revolution that belongs to the historical trace of these jeans: the jeans, in effect, 
experience rebellion for their wearer. The ‘rips’ symbolically stand for ‘passive’ 
resistance to the system. Capitalism enfolds an anti-capitalist stance to maintain the 
system as it is. Similar to Barrlett’s examination of jeans, Markus Waltz et al. (2014) 
tackle the ‘magic of ethical bands,’ drawing heavily on the interpassive claims of both 
Pfaller and Žižek. The research team of Waltz & company from the School of 
Business, Stockholm University seem to play up the power of advertising. Conrad 
Lodziak (2000), however, argues that the influence of consumer culture has been 
exaggerated. What is consumed “can best be explained in terms of practical 
responses to contemporary living conditions rather than cultural factors” (112).  Once 
basic needs are met, the shift is towards non-commodifiable values such as family 
relationships, love and friendship. Lodziak maintains that ‘institutional consumption’ 
by industries, businesses, shops and government departments are responsible for 
the manipulation of needs. How resistance is acted out, even interpassively as Pfaller 







(2009:180) suggests, is an escape from Althusserian interpellation, a passionate 
detachment form enjoyment to avoid subjectification. To give up pleasure as a form 
of painful jouissance must surely be a perverse form of resistance?  
 
 Much is placed on jouissance (enjoyment) and its differentiation from pleasure 
and desire, but what of affect (sometimes equated with emotions)? ‘Enjoyment’ 
seems to do way too much work as there are no nuances to it, no questioning of 
intensity: no careful differentiation when it is ‘phallic’ or ‘feminine’ or jouir-sense; that 
is, jouissance as ‘enjoy-meant’ … as well as other attempts Lacan tried to make it 
more ‘precise.’ It remains a baffling concept that is sexuality and libidinally charged. 
This is why the Nietzschean notion of forces, as developed by Deleuze (1983) seems 
much more satisfying. As van Oenen notes, “there are no texts explicitly discussing 
the possible bodily aspects of interpassivity” (2011, 138). Van Oenen calls on Alain 
Ehrenberg and Peter Sloterdijk to make his point. Ehrenberg’s position seems to be 
the anxiety that surrounds the neoliberal subject where choice is placed entirely on 
the self. Sloterdijk, on the other hand, points to the endless training that is required in 
contemporary life; oddly, van Oenen does not see that this is precisely the flexible 
subject of capitalism. What van Oenen sees in such over-activity is basically the 
micro-monitoring that goes with measuring all aspects of the body, it’s constant self-
surveillance by health care aficionados, for instance. Interpassivity is basically the 
outsourcing of the explicit body into various externalized technologies. Van Oenen 
accurately saw that this ‘outsourcing’ not only extends to the cyber-servo 
mechanisms that, in control societies (Deleuze, 1992) have agency, but also such 
outsourcing now includes authoritarian figures of populist movements around the 
world – be it Tayyip Erdoğan in Turkey, Trump in the US, LePenn in France and so on. 
“The populist leader chooses whatever signifier will mobilize the greatest number of 
people” (2011, 144). 
 
 The term interpassivity does too much work by itself; it is overly generalized, as 
there are any number of differences as to how it is understood and used. It comes 
across as a universal claim, which is a problem with psychoanalysis in general. It is 
said to be ‘common’ for what is often claimed as an uncommon occurrence. Van 
Oenen (2011), for instance writes: “Interpassivity points to some sort of transfer in 
which some other entity takes over some activity, or passivity from us – it is active, or 
passive, in our place, on our behalf. … part of our subjectivity is transferred to some 
outside agency” (133).  The broadness of this description is indicative of its over 







generalization. Žižek’s interpassivity differs from Pfaller’s. In the 1997 version, Plague 
of Fantasies (144-160) his position still has close affinities with Pfaller in the examples 
he calls on; the idea that such enjoyment is delegated through the Other where belief 
is externalized to insure the illusion of ideology, and that there is always a necessary 
subject (a credulous someone) who is supposed to believe. In Žižek’s exploration of 
interpassivity directed at cyberspace in 1998a, his discussion of cybergames follows 
what might be viewed as the conventional understanding of interpassivity where, 
from the Lacanian position, Oedipus plays a dominant role. The desire of the Other is 
understood as essentially the designed rules of the computer game programmers 
that are in place; the avatar controlled by the counsel player is ‘enjoying’ in his or her 
stead (Pelletier, 2005). Even a more hyperbolic example of interpassivity in this regard 
is the life led by avatars in Second Life as Mattias Fuchs (2009) provides the standard 
plethora of interpassive agents that are available. As we have seen, this simple 
mechanism is questionable.  
 
In his 1999 essay on cyberspace Žižek latches on to the Japanese tamagochi 
toy as his primary example. Interpassivity undergoes modification. While enjoyment 
is delegated to the ‘needs’ of this toy, as it always has the initiative, but one cannot 
say, as in Pfaller’s case, that there is no interactivity, or that there is no completion 
without such interaction, or that no interaction does not make a difference. Further, 
the tamagochi toy is not a commodity fetish in the classical Freudian sense, nor in 
the sense that both Žižek and Pfaller borrow from Octave Mannoni (2003) Freudian 
modifications where the Other as the one who is supposed to believe does not exist, 
disavowed by means of the fetish; the place of the gullible Other is now held by the 
fetish itself. Pfaller (2005) follows Žižek here as well, recounting the ‘hamster story’ 
told by Žižek about a friend whose wife dies of breast cancer, which results in the 
beloved pet animal becoming his fetishistic object as the embodied disavowal of his 
wife’s death. When the hamster dies, his friend collapses and is hospitalized for 
suicidal depression. When a tamaguchi ‘dies,’ there are children, no doubt, who are 
deeply affected, like the death of a dog, or any other pet – but, it’s a stretch to see this 
claim comparable to the hamster story. It is a question of kind, and not degree, 
unless of course the symbolic order has become a Blade Runner cybernetic World of 
cloned and controlled creatures. The tamagochi toy brings into the equation 
rudimentary AI into the exchange. It seems a disservice to understand all ‘smart 
technologies’ as being interpassive, as there is no recognition of the modification that 
our species undergoes as our brain physiology is being modified via such 







technologies, the synaesthetic exchanges taking place between homo sapiens and 
AI (Weibel, 2009). Such as the speculation concerning the ‘bicameral mind’ when 
written language was invented as a technology (Jaynes, 1976). Again, it would be a 




Interpassivity applied to cynical reason presents a similar structure rehearsed by 
Žižek. Cognitive resistance to structures of normative work and management 
practices, understood as an obvious form of anti-capitalism that a cynical attitude 
seems to provide, is reinforced and made possible through a fantasy of becoming an 
authentic ‘autonomous’ self. This enables a distancing from the workplace to take 
place: the idea being that workers know fully well how to play the ‘game’ within the 
parameters of the company’s ideology by being independent thinkers, ‘still’ 
employed, yet achieving some degrees of freedom to make decisions on their own 
(Contu, 2008; Fleming & Spicer, 2003, 2007; Johnsen et al., 2009). Such distancing, 
however, strikes me more as a coping mechanism than a ‘disavowal.’ What choice 
do they have after all, if they do not want to be let go or fired from their job? In Terry 
Gillam’s film Brazil (1985), the bureaucrat can only dream of an escape as he sits in 
his cubical. Times have changed in the corporate world of post-Fordism. When the 
fantasy of an authentic self matches the activity of the corporate self, then a loop of 
reinforcement emerges: the fantasy of my authentic self conforms with the work self, 
making work appear ‘enjoyable.’ Is this still an interpassive structure when the ego 
ideal and Ideal ego collapse; that is, when the injunction, or order to work, is 
overcome by over-performing; or when enjoyment is found in challenge and 
competition, so vividly demonstrated by stock traders in Showtime’s television series 
Billions? Is that still an interpassive structure? Or, might we call it something else? 
 
  What is often the case, stress from performative competition is found in the 
outlet of physical sport. Is sport to be seen as a fantasy of the authentic self? Is sport 
an interpassive activity? It does enable one to cope with work – but where then is 
cynicism in this structure? The gap between a corporate self and an ‘authentic’ self 
does not break down; it is managed. Yet, it is managed because the activity of sport 
provides the necessary distancing from work. I could, however, very easily substitute 
more harmful activities for the same mechanism of distancing than sport: alcohol, 
marijuana, cocaine, heroin, substances than might facilitate a breakdown. Yet, even 







here there are those who utilize such substances and maintain working lives, as is 
the case with many physicians and actors, although the quality of such lives may 
well be questioned. But, when does one disengage from professional work in post-
Fordist control societies? When work is overwhelming, that is a different story. Both 
activities collapse; the so-called authentic self provides no distance but reinforces the 
work self. It then becomes pathological. The point is that both work place and sport 
can be places where enjoyment is achieved. All this is to throw at least some doubt 
that there is one general psychic structure – interpassivity, which fits all. It does seem 
that high stress work in the capitalist system requires the splitting of the self to 
increase productivity (creativity). No wonder office designed spaces in Silicon Valley 
look more like recreational playgrounds with climbing walls, exercise bikes and the 
like. The collapse between our working and non-working lives, work and play, has 
turned all activity – be it ‘active’ or ‘passive’ – into calculable energy for profit of one 
sort or other. 
 
 Žižek’s call on the cynical attitude as structuring interpassivity has been 
predictably applied to cinema as well, including its digitalized shift where CGI effects 
that generate computer-animated characters (e.g., Jar-Jar Binks, Gollum, Wall-E) are 
taken to serve the “new ‘canned’ fetish-audience,” according to Támas Nagypál 
(2014:182), who closely follows Žižek to the letter. This is taken as the “idiotic” passive 
enjoyment at the core of modern subjectivity. It our “inability to escape the short-
circuit of belief, … which is now becoming an internal matter of the digital, as a safe 
distance from the human spectator” (Ibid.) Nagypal seems to think that these CGI 
figures are equivalent to a glitch aesthetic as the truth of the new media’s automation 
principle. Such a claim however is not developed. It seems enigmatic, if not outright 
problematic, as ‘glitch aesthetics’ is very much confined to a specific period in the 
new media’s past, at the turn of the 21st century when synthesizers where in their 
technological infancy compared to contemporary models where glitches can be 
simulated removing ‘accident’. The playfulness of CGI effects as the “powers of the 
false” in Deleuzian terms are again ignored. The creative exploration of alternate 
worlds through such CGI effects seem to be dismissed, overridden by the structure of 
interpassivity. A similar Žižekian follower is Paul A. Taylor’s (2013) questioning 
hactivism, or the hacker in general. He maintains that what is seen as the height of 
interactivity is simply meta-level interpassivity. Hackers become the “false alibis for a 
more general loss of autonomy in the rest of society’s technologically mediated 
interactions” (248). Claims such as Nagypal and Taylor’s are questionable, as 












Interactivity and interpassivity may be just too dichotomous when thinking through 
the changes that technology has wrought. Miya Yoshida (2008), for instance, 
presents a careful analysis of two (so-called) interactive art practices that were part 
of her curatorial exhibit called, “The Invisible Landscape.” Both of these participatory 
artworks defy the interactivity–interpassivity labels as theorized by Pfaller and Žižek. 
The first, etherSoud by Swedish musician and sound artist Henrik Frisk (2005), invites 
an audience to participate in the creation of a new sound event by sending text 
messages from their mobile phones. For every message sent, the data is 
downloaded, processed and then analyzed by a controlling program; this data is 
then turned into control signals, and sent to a sound synthesizer. The ‘sonic object’ 
created can last as long as two minutes. Two different modes of this experiment 
were attempted, one was a stand alone interactive sound installation, and the other 
involved several performers (Frisk and a drummer) who improvised the sound of the 
installation along with the audience’s SMS text messages. Yoshida’s point is that the 
complexity of the installation surpasses any bracketing within an interactive or 
interpassive dichotomy; it was closer to a flow, a cluster of anonymous random acts 
as creative corporeality is never fixed within predetermined conditions. This sonic 
installation held the potential for a new coefficient of autonomous agency for 
participation. It seemed impossible to impose pre-existing fixed roles on participants. 
The sonic installation allowed for every position possible within participation: 
performer, composer, conductor, and originator. This coefficient of plural roles within 
a participant appeared and disappeared, differing with each performace. These roles 
would shift and oscillate with one another, and change freely without any conceptual 
issues. It was not possible to grasp any specific fixed condition as being either 
interactive or interpassive. The offered interactivity neither created any confrontation 
(which is specified by Pfaller, 2004), nor did it demand responsibility of any kind (as 
Žižek would want it). The quality of the ‘becoming’ between different positions was 
quite flexible.  
 
The subject in this sonic installation was not fixed, as found in the structures of 
interpassivity; there is no confrontation with the Other. In this installation, the “I” 







position constantly shifts and replaces the Other as player, conductor, composer, or 
all of these. The ‘subject’ is in a constant ‘becoming’, and is not fixed. It is hard to fix 
who is the interpassive subject and who is the Other; that is, who is the delegated 
‘subject’ of pleasure. In etherSound the framework of the Other’s objective belief 
versus subjective or personal beliefs does not seem to function. Yoshida’s claim is 
that etherSound opens up an imaginary space (the ‘ether’) between the relationship 
of act and effect. This creates an indeterminate space that goes beyond interactivity 
and interpassivity.  It is the point where the illusion of interaction can grow.  The 
increased complexity of computer processes creates situations in which there is no 
way of knowing the full repertoire of what’s at stake. Such installations as etherSound 
have no specific idea of a goal, nor any destination or task to accomplish, and, as a 
sonic installation, it has no idea of generating a better more appropriate satisfaction, 
placing jouissance into question. 
 
 In her second query, CallCutta Mobile Phone Theatre (a theatre piece 
organized by the German/Swiss theatre collective ‘Rimini Protokoll’ in 2005), the idea 
was to provide personalized guided city tours via mobile phone-based conversations 
through a call center to locals. The call agents in Calcutta and Berlin operated as 
guides and actors at the same time to navigate local audiences through their city 
streets, opening up hidden memories and new dimensions locals perhaps new 
nothing of. The idea was to have these actors involve locals into more and more 
personal dialogue, eliciting and talking about their memories. The Calcutta call 
center actors did this for locals in Berlin, opening up the bizarre incident of an Indian 
accent guiding locals through their own city. Oddly enough, the distance and cultural 
backgrounds facilitated dialogue. The absurdity is that remote guiding by an actor 
who has never been to the Calcutta or Berlin would be able to pull this off, a feat not 
possible without access to surveillance technology, and a strict script with a given 
route to follow, with a specific order of visiting sites, contents and points of 
navigation. Again, Yoshida’s point is that this theatre puts interpassivity to question, or 
perhaps even extends the concept as this theatre performance shows that 
communicative dialogues produce illusionary spaces such that all 
telecommunication is a shift towards production and subsumption that surpasses 
the interpassive-interactive dichotomy. In both of her examples the subject-object 
positions are not fixed, but are transcended constantly, flipped and twisted, such 
actions being a symptom of network communication. The processes of realization, 
production and consumption become inseparable in the realm of mobile 







communication. Production-consumption are simultaneous, linked to global 
networks of communication – the “real subsumption” of social life as theorized by 
Michael Hardt & Toni Negri, in their influential Empire (2000), writing at the same time 
as Pfaller. In mobile, networked communications, the intentions and aims of projects 
are twisted and flipped in different directions, much different than what artists had 
intended, making the interactive and interpassive frameworks dysfunctional. 
CallCutta by Rimi Protokoll group was meant as a criticism of global exploitation of 
labour within the structure of the call center industry; as it turned out the theatre 
piece produced a ‘real subsumption’ of social life. Love, personal memories, 
individual lifestyles as profiles were exploited. If this was indeed the case, should all 




Gjis van Oenen (2011) makes the claim that interpassivity is an extension of the idea 
that subjectivity is transferred to some outside agency. “[W]e have outsourced some 
part – whether active or passive – of our subjectivity to some external medium or 
institution” (133, original italic). Added to this is his second point: “such institutions or 
media appear to exercise some sort of custody over us; they take care of something 
that we, apparently, cannot or do not want to take care of ourselves. … They 
compensate for some lack, or inability, on our side” (ibid, original italic). And, then 
finally, such interpassivity, if it is to be still called that, “implies some sort of transfer 
from human to nonhuman entities. Activities, or responsibilities, or ‘ethicalities’ (or 
passivities) now become the province of nonhuman beings” (ibid). These ‘insourcing’ 
entities ‘enjoy’ some form of autonomy; “they somehow set their own goals and 
develop their own strategies” (ibid).  
 
 Such a claim, just like the tamagochi toy, launches us into an area that both 
Phaller and Žižek seem to resist by staying with the Freud-Lacanian line of 
psychoanalysis that remains strongly anthropocentric. Here I am referring to the third 
development of cybernetics where inhuman machines play a much more significant 
interactive role than the examples of interpassivity usually developed: canned 
laugher, prayer rolls, computer games and the like. “The interpassive relation with 
technology is based on the logic of ‘prosthesis,’ which can be distinguished from the 
logic of ‘extension,’” writes Svitiana Matviyenko (2015, 133). As modalities, extension 
and prosthesis are intimately related; they differ according to metonymy (extension) 







and metaphor (prosthetics); surplus (extension) and lack (prosthesis); the logic of 
software (extension) and the logic of application (lack). These are not dichotomous 
terms but intertwined ones. Extension extends the body; it enhances certain physical 
or mental capacities. Bodies are in continuous transformation, absorbing or rejecting 
on a continuous basis, as there is no ‘original’ form. Such extensions, as surpluses, 
means that the body can become addicted to them. A prosthesis can also be a 
surplus, which constitutes self as lack.  Matviyenko, calling on the work of Luca 
Bosetti (2010), points out that ‘addiction’ and ‘prosthesis’ have a similar meaning; they 
both mean something ‘added,’ and this something that is added to the body refers to 
signifier of the law in the case of addition and to the signifier as such when it comes 
to grammatical prosthesis. Technological extension and prosthesis are constantly 
reversing from one mode to the other. A global network managed by ‘smart’ 
technologies are extension devices that are useful and empowering additions as 
‘addictions,’ which lead to a modality of inhuman prosthesis with human 
collaboration, tending to be addictive in a co-dependency (like apps that are 
available to serve 24/7).  
 
For Matviyenko, extension is an addition while prosthesis is an addiction. A 
differentiation needs to be made between users’ agency as resistance, disobedience 
and activity that is facilitated by prosthetic technologies. Activity as a reaction to 
software programs, and not agency per se, is what cybernetics is able to do in the 
neoliberal capitalist technologies, thereby making it appear that subjects are being 
individuated. It is “it-referenced” interaction. The controlling system treats the other 
like an “it.” This can be noted as being classically interpassive, a similar point made 
by Lev Manovich in 2001 (and again in 2013) where all interactive media enable us 
“to follow pre-programed, objectively existing associations, to identify with someone’s 
else mental structure,” and thereby mistaking “the structure of somebody’s else mind 
for our own” (2001: 61). For Serres (2007), parasite is a better term. ‘Host’ and ‘guest’ 
combine within one another to suggest the abuse cybernetics has wrought. 
Benjamin Bratton (2016) calls the spread of ‘appificaton’ as a ‘reversed panopticon.’ 
Rather being subject to a surveillance machine where authority is internalised, the 
reverse panopticon makes the subject fully complicit with networks despite risks; 
such an ideal user is constantly performing for the gaze of the network. The 
posthuman neoliberal subject is caught by the prosthetic extensions that are 
addictively attached. If this is then called interpassivity, one wonders just where 
creativity enters into such an understanding. One of the significant benefits of 







changing paradigms to a Deleuze and Guattari position is that becoming, revolved 
around an event, enables creativity to bloom, rather than some extraordinary 
‘authentic act’ (as in Žižek’s case) that changes the coordinates of the social order. 
Žižek writes often verbatim throughout his publications: “there is no freedom outside 
the traumatic encounter with the opacity of the Other’s desire” (Žižek, 2002: lvi).   
 
 van Oenen’s use of the concept differs from both Pfaller and Žižek. He explicitly 
mentions his is not a Lacanian based view but a historical one, which makes things 
much more interesting (Van Oenen, 2011:134). Dismissing its universalist and 
transhistorcal claims, Van Oenen’s own case of historicizing interpassivity’s 
emergence as a phenomenon because of “successful emancipation” (135), and the 
enlightened subject “having become thoroughly emancipated” (ibid) smacks of 
Francis Fukuyama’s 1992 thesis (first developed in 1989) as to the ‘end of ideology,’ 
as if the promised land of neoliberal democracy had finally been achieved. Van 
Oenen seems to maintain that ‘we’ (?) “have become interactively complicit in the 
constitution of most, if not all norms that govern modern social life” (ibid). Such is the 
“blessing of emancipation, the freedom to live only under self-chosen norms” (ibid, 
original italic). His point is that this progressive movement, came to fore in the 1960s 
and established itself in the 1970s. Such a development was pervaded by interactvity 
- emancipated interactive life was the democratic ideal. Capitalism, in this view had 
its liberatory moment. Van Oenen does not read such self-realization and 
emancipation as being guided by free decisions within the structures of a 
meritocracy, rather it appears like an idealization, and this “blessing” has now 
become a “burden,” a “self posed one” at that. ‘We’ suffer from “interactive mental 
fatigue” (136). Sloterdijk’s thesis of cynical reason has no truck here. Rather, because 
of this emancipatory or interactive exhaustion we “outsource” our actions and 
responsibilities to act to others, like institutions, supervisory agency and to the 
government. “We expect others to act, or to take responsibility, in our name, on our 
behalf” (137). Some would say this is a simple sentence for the meaning of 
representative democracy. It is surprising that Van Oenen does not see the failure of 
the democratic state in relation to global capitalism and corporate growth but puts 
the blame on a nebulous ‘we’ (the people). It’s as though Van Oenen takes the 
demand to enjoy, which Žižek is best known for, as the people’s inability to ‘enjoy 
enough.’ In order to enjoy their freedom, they require a break from it – hence 
interpassivity. 
 







 Enjoyment in the capitalist system is always structured by lack; an interpassive 
displacement of experience seems caught up in an exchange of services rendered 
by the big Other of one form or another. Any holiday, not just a family holiday, where 
tourism is concerned already structures interpassivity: rooms are booked, the travel 
route is marked, buses are rented, restaurants chosen; the journey has been laid out 
for you. You need only start your adventure on it. If it turns into a flop, it is you who are 
to blame, not ‘them’; and if the sale of the fantasy has been hyped a little too much, 
just try getting your money back! Sam Burgum (2013) offers a succinct way that so-
called ‘resistance’ in advertising works with the interpassive self to preclude an anti-
capitalist stance. In the precarious word of capitalism (‘realist capitalism’ as Mark 
Fisher (2009) would say), resentment has arisen as the gap between rich and poor 
has widened; the recent tax reforms that the Republican party under Trump 
managed to pass will further increase this divide. What is ‘odd’ is that the display or 
outright exposure of social injustices and ills of the social order does not lead to 
‘action,’ rather it becomes a ‘mild’ form of traumatization.  The message is that not 




A somewhat different mechanism of belief and its ‘disavowal’ is presented by 
Marshall Alcorn, Jr. (2013) that does away with the Oedipal leanings embraced by 
Pfaller and Žižek, which Deleuze and Guattari so strongly resist as well. Mannoni’s 
phrase “ I know well, but all the same …” raises many other questions, as the 
problematic word is “to know.” In what way it functions epistemologically (via 
cognition) or ontologically (does the respondent ‘truly’ know?) raises more questions 
that have as much to do with neurological mechanisms of the brain than simply 
being confined to psychoanalysis alone. It seems that the physiology of the brain is 
lost on psychoanalysis, and its defenders want nothing to do with it (Samuels, 2017; 
De Vos, 2013, 2016). There is a rather misunderstood reading of interpassivity for 
those who question the neurological importance of the brain, summatively put as: “It 
thinks,” rather than the anthropocentric psychoanalytic reading that “I think.” The “It 
thinks” refers to a cerebral unconscious of affects and percepts (discussed above 
when it comes to totally immersive environments – see section 3 - and below, when 
it comes to the ‘emotional brain’). Neurological insights bring out the intensity of 
forces from the Outside that are unconsciously processed through embodiment, the 
“half-second delay” of Benjamin Libet’s (1999) experiments, before they are made 







conscious and subject to change. The development of the so-called “affective turn” 
explores just this understanding, making generalizations surrounding ‘enjoyment’ 
somewhat empty. For Deleuze (2000[1986]), “the brain is the screen,” allowing post-
Deleuzian scholars such as Brain Massumi (2002) and William Connolly (2002) to 
explore the political ramifications of this. In this regard, defenders of psychoanalysis 
such as Jan De Vos (2013, 2016), who question Connolly and Massumi’s Deleuzian-
Spinozian inflected work, go too far in their criticism. Jan de Vos is spot on 
concerning the dangers of the neurological sciences introducing new versions of 
eugenics. Yet his reading of Connolly’s work (De Vos, 2013) and Massumi (De Vos, 
2016), who develop the logic of sensation in relation to Deleuze, misses the point as 
he seems to take this direction, not in schizoanalytic terms, but as a psychologizing, 
self-help turn, avoiding the more radical claims of affect theory as recently articulated 
by Massumi (2015). Along the same lines of recognizing the emotional brain, Cathryn 
Malbou’s (2009) work as well questions Žižek’s position in particular, and 
psychoanalysis in general for overstressing an epistemology of meaning. This 
course, is quickly defended by Žižek’s (2009), bringing to fore the dispute between 
the Freudian unconscious and the cerebral unconscious, the later leans toward 
Spinoza and Deleuze and Guattari explorations of schizonalysis, which is what I 
would defend here against interpassivity claims of the former.  
 
 Marshal Alcorn’s rethinking of ‘disavowal’ is largely set in a university setting.  
What to make of first year college physics students who were taught to understand 
motion from a Newtonian paradigm rather than hold onto their ‘common sense’ 
understanding of its functions. Despite a year’s course, complete with tests that 
demonstrated that they ‘understood’ the new concepts of motion, at the end of the 
semester students did not change how they thought despite the evidence that 
required a change in logic. Even when they witnessed a physics experiment that 
demonstrated the falsehood of their beliefs, they continued to insist on the validity of 
their false beliefs. They performed all sorts of mental gymnastics to avoid confronting 
and revising their fundamental underlying principles that guided their understanding. 
Some of these students received high grades in their class. How does disavowal 
work in this situation?  
 
 Alcorn reviews the work of Ramachandram (1999) who works with 
anosognosia patients. Such patients hallucinate the use of their paralyzed arms. In 
their belief system, although seemingly ‘psychotic,’ they appear secure in their 







emotional belief that their paralyzed limbs are indeed functioning. A most 
extraordinary phenomenon happens when Ramachandram triggers waking REM by 
injecting cold water into a patient’s ear canal. The patient can then recognize her 
paralysis as if such information is stored in memory, which is then released during 
REM making it conscious. Rather than ‘disavowal,’ or ‘denial, ‘which connotes 
consciousness,’ Alcorn uses the term “the desire not to know.” The differential aspect 
is that this ‘desire not to know’ is more to do with affect and the emotional brain than 
the elaboration of Oedipal structures per se. Alcorn uses the term “emotional 
assimilation of thought” to work out the social, psychological and emotional activities 
involved in an assemblage. Antonio Damasio (1994) lists five kinds of information 
that are fully operative but not consciously perceived. Such information can be in the 
form of internalized images or sensations that remain present in the brain, but are not 
present to consciousness. Damasio mentions images that are formed but not 
attended to; neural patterns that never become images; all dispositions that are 
acquired through experience, and the quiet remodelling and networks that never 
become explicitly known. The emotional brain thesis also emerged around the same 
time that Pfaller’s thesis came to fore. Alcorn’s own position draws on Wilfred Bion’s 
(1961) concept of -K (K= knowledge) as “desire not to know” wherein patients do not 
want to know the thoughts that are beginning to form in their own mind. While there 
is an emergent knowledge working itself towards consciousness, there is also a 
‘sector’ of the self that is in conflict with this new knowledge. Anxieties emerge as 
emotions that accompany memories are in play.  
 
 It strikes me these unconscious factors complicate the interpassive structure. 
Perhaps the point of contention is the linguistic one as Lacan always maintained that 
the unconscious is ‘structured like a language,’ which has resulted in all sorts of 
contortions as to what he ‘truly’ meant; but of course Deleuze and Guattari called him 
on this, especially Guattari’s developments of asemiotics and their call on the Danish 
linguist, Louis Hjelmslev rather than that of Ferdinand de Saussure. The mind can 
comfortably deny visual perception and logic and their impact on truth claims. While, 
certainly ideology is not false consciousness, it is not simply a distortion but needs to 
be thought through in topological terms where we have a much more complex 
picture between conscious –unconscious merging, between their inter-and intra-
actions than say via a ‘parallax view’ or a ‘gap’ between them, or philosophically 
dressed up as a difference between Kantian illusion and the transcendental ego. 
There is a complex interchange between left and right brain processing; between 







conscious and unconscious thought; between emotional brain and reason, all of 
which neurosciences problematize. Deleuze and Guattari (1987) once more come 
into play. The ‘body without organs’ (BwO) is organized by a particular emotional 
structure, an existing state of feeling, structured by memory. The Real is given a 
physiological basis, as in the psychoanalytic and psychological developments of 
children in the explorations of Daniel Stern (1985) where the emotional schemas that 
form the core identity are referred to as “Representations of Interactions that have 
been Generalized” or RIG’s. RIG’s are shaped by assemblages of desire, for example, 
breast-milk-mother. This assemblage involves the interrelations of being hungry, 
being positioned at the breast, opening the mouth, beginning to suck, getting milk 
with all the accompanying tactile, olfactory, visual sensations and perceptions, all 
complexly interacting together to shape memory of the experience.  Such an 
assemblage then become generalized. When an infant has a certain feeling, that 
feeling recalls to mind the RIG on which that feeling is an attribute. Such memories 
are retrievable whenever one of the attributes of the RIG assemblage is present. This 
means whenever a RIG is activated, the originary lived experience in the form of 
active memory comes into play. These are existential refrains, repeated patterns that 
establish core subjectivity. The activation of RIG (the physicality of the Real) is a 
complex mix of the biological, sociological and physiological. The psyche in this 
paradigm of understanding surpasses the unconscious structured like a language. 
The Other as symbolic Order is understood as an assemblage, following Deleuze 
and Guattari, which plunges interpassivity onto another register of complexity 
shaped by the assemblages of desire, informed by RIG’s. It also presents a shift into 
an ecological thinking that is superior, in my view, to the limitation that a Lacanian 
inflected Žižekian-Pfaller position. Subjectification are forces that position subjects, 
forces which are autonomous of one another whether they emerge from groups, 
assembles, or machines. 
 
 The Real register is shaped by amodal perceptions and encodings via the 
vitality affects of the body. These become linked to the emotional schemas or RIG’s. 
The physical enjoyment (or repulsion) of the Real (here understood asemiotically) is 
in constant state of becoming, never entirely stable. One can see from such a theory 
as to why conflicting or uncomfortable information is simply not integrated by 
memory – the “I”, in “I know” is simply dismissed to lead life as usual. All meaning is 
affectively loaded; ideas are valued in relation to affective consequences. They have 
affective resonance. The pre-existing affective networks as organized by past 







memories cannot be dismissed. Human action is always grounded in emotional 
networks of hope, fear, suspicion, pride, shame, and enthusiasm. These are 
manipulated by politicians and by post-Taylorist management strategies alike. 
Cynical disavowal may well be using one such circuit, but relationships seem to be 
thinly theorized as simply ‘Other,’ rather than the complexity of the assemblage that is 
in play. 
 
 To summarize what is a random essay that ‘interrogates’ intepassivity by   
questioning its differentiation from interactivity, it seems that both terms are 
inadequate when tested against contemporary cybernetic art. The psychoanalytic 
reading seems to avoid grappling with the way technologies can physiologically 
change the brain responses, following the Deleuzian adage “the brain is the screen.” 
That there is so much resistance to any form of neurological research that identifies 
the physiology of affect (often confused with emotions), questioning the 
generalization of jouissance (enjoyment) by the psychoanalytic proponents (Žižek, 
Samules, De Vos) should come as no surprise. Interpassivity, as developed by Van 
Oenen, seems to finger the historical shift of cybernetic technologies but does not 
grasp them as part of societies of control, as Deleuze and Foucault had, rather 
maintains that this is a loss of emancipatory progress. All in all, what remains difficult 
to adequately articulate is precisely what might be the lines of flight away from global 
capitalism, given that technologies are not about to ‘disappear, and that the World 





2 “Whereas Žižek’s thesis states: feelings and convictions can exist externally, our double thesis states: 1. 
There are artworks that view themselves; and 2. there are consumers who want to be replaced by something that 
consumes in their place” (2014: 20, original italic). 
3 Juliana Brunello (2010) mentions this in a post in relation to a talk on interpassivity by Gjis van Oenen, 
a theorist whom I mention latter. Van Oenen takes Sermon’s work as a paradigmatic of interactive art 
in the 90s. 
4 Available at http://www.hgb-leipzig.de/~sermon/dream/videos.html 
5 Projects undertaken at the Banff Center, Canada in the early 1990s as documented in Moser (1996) 
are taken as the earliest such experimentation in this archive. 
6 Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=54O4VP3tCoY 
7 Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XCWaMll0leI 
                                                      







                                                                                                                                                                                    
8 Available at: https://kildall.com/project/paradise-ahead/ 
9 Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sESVN02BbDg 
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